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China’s VAT while seemingly conventional has two major impurities. One is that a separate export
rebate system exists where rebate rates are linked from rates paid on creditable inputs. The other is
the use of an income base for which there is no crediting of taxes on capital good, rather than the more
conventional consumption base with expensing of investment expenditures. Here we argue that in
a conventional competitive model both impurities would typically involve a welfare loss, but if we
use a numerical calibrated equilibrium model with a monetary structure capturing by these Chinese
features in which the trade surplus is endogenously determined and the exchange rate is exogenously
set, things are different. These impurities effectively act as added taxes on domestic production (lowed
export rebate rates, taxes on a larger VAT base) and tax exporting. Tax exporting reduces exports
which lowers the surplus and accumulation of foreign currency. In a static model, a reduced surplus
is welfare improving. Using 2002 data, we thus find that China’s impure VAT system yields welfare
gains in contrast to what a conventional model would show. These results are important since there
are arguments being made inside and outside China for changes to be made and move closer to a pure
VAT. Our results suggest that unless there are wider changes first in macro-structure, such changes
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China since 1994 has had a Value Added Tax (VAT) which seems conventional by 
international standards, but on closer inspection is nonstandard and impure in some 
key areas. Export credits are not always given, and are used as a stabilization device 
on an on/off basis in certain key sectors (textiles and apparel). The tax is 
administrated on an income basis in most sectors, but on a consumption basis in such 
areas as light industry. In addition, the tax is effectively restricted to manufacturing 
level with a lower rate turnover tax on key service sectors.   
 
Here we argue that in a conventional competitive monetary framework such features 
of the VAT are distortionary and impose welfare costs. However, in a world of fixed 
exchange rates, non accommodative monetary policy and endogenous trade deficits 
(as currently in China), this need not be the case. We use a simple single period 
monetary general equilibrium model with fixed exchange rates and endogenous trade 
suplus which we calibrate to 2002 Chinese data and show the impure Chinese VAT to 
be welfare improving compared to the classical neutral tax since it reduces the trade 
surplus. 
 
Essentially the argument advanced is that in classical public finance analysis of the 
VAT, departures from a pure destination based consumption form would be regarded 
as distortionary and imposing welfare costs. However, in a model where the trade 
surplus is endogenously determined given the exchange rate and non accommodative 
monetary policy, such policies may instead be welfare improving compared to a pure 
VAT through these trade effects because they increase production costs for exports 
and lower the size of the trade surplus. We also show how changes in export rebate 
rates and exchange rate policy can be substitute instruments in terms of macro 
impacts on trade flows. There effects can clearly be offset by others excluded from the 
model. For instance, a labor leisure choice in a static model will change the analysis 
of an income base versus a consumption base because with a larger base equal yield 
  2rates will be lower under an income tax and distortions of labor supply reduced. We 
concentrate only on the trade effects of the impure base and their intreaction with the 
surplus. 
 
We first discuss the Chinese VAT, as well as the two elements of impurities discussed 
above. We set out how they operate and have evolved over time. Interactions with 
trade performance and exchange rate policy are also highlighted. We then present a 
monetized general equilibrium trade model in which the trade surplus is endogenously 
determined given exchange rate and monetary policies. Production structures in the 
model capture intermediate production and value added functions for a model 
calibrated to 2002 Chinese data covering 10 sectors and capturing both China’s key 
items of foreign trade and products/sectors where impurities in tax VAT treatment 
arise both in export rebates and the use of an income basis. The model is then 
calibrated to base case data for 2002 and generate a supporting parameterization for 
trade, consumption, the trade surplus and production in the presence of VAT 
impurities. We then compute an equilibrium in the absence of these impurities, by 
moving to a pure VAT eitheringly or jointly. We show that relative to a pure VAT these 
impurities allow for tax exporting effects which reduce the size of the surplus and 
yield a welfare gain. We also show how a structure giving no rebates is equivalent to a 
Renminbi revaluation, suggesting equivalence and interplay between these 
instruments. The broader theme of the results is that particular features of policy 
structure in China which may strike those versed in classical theory as odd may make 
good sense given the overall policy system within which elements reside. 
 
 
2.  China’s impure VAT 
 
China introduced the Value Added Tax (VAT) in 1994 as part of a general tax reform. 
It replaced a preexisting cascading whole sale turnover tax, and was seen both at 
home and abroad as a major improvement in terms of removing tax distortions and 
  3providing a stable revenue source. The VAT has since emerged as the major and 
secure revenue source underpinning the finances of the Chinese state. It has a standard 
tax rate of 17%, which is largely restricted to manufactures and is supplemented by a 
low rate (3%) turnover tax on key service items. The lower 13% rate applies to a 
range of products (agriculture, vegetables, heating and natural gas, chemicals, 
fertilizer, metals and coal, see Table 1 ). 
 
China’s VAT is administered by the State Administration of Taxation (VAT on imports 
is collected by customs) and VAT tax revenues shared between the central government 
and local governments who receive roughly 25% of revenue. The VAT coexists at 
enterprise level with a consumption tax whose rates range from 3-17% on all taxable 
items, and a business tax at rates of 3-20% on taxable items, as well as enterprise 
income taxes. These additional taxes apply to domestic sales and imports and cover 
areas both where the VAT is difficult to collect and luxury oriented consumption items 
such as cars. Among all Chinese taxes, the VAT is the most important revenue source. 
 
The Chinese VAT, however, has evolved in ways which are quite different from VATs 
elsewhere, being used both as a stabilization device and an incentive mechanism for 
policy objectives such as location of firms and area of economic activity (such as high 
technology products). Specifically, though the tax is formally administered (as in most 
countries) on a destination basis, rebates of input taxes are variable by sector and 
commodity, and also used in an on/off manner for stabilization purposes. This is 
especially the case in the textiles and clothing sector where export tax credits are 
terminated periodically when export growth rates are seen as too high, and become 
the source of international pressure. One of China’s actions following the termination 
of the Multi Fiber Arrangement (MFA) in 2005 was to reduce export rebates as a way 
of slowing the export surge of newly quota free products to the US and other 
developed country markets. China has announced policy of limited export rebates for 
VAT which varies by product and which change over time as in 2003, 2005 and more 
recently in 2006. 
  4Table  1      China’s  VAT  Taxable  Items  and  Rates 
 
Coverage of collection  Rate 
 




Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, aquatic products; 
Edible vegetable and grain products; 
Tap water, heating, cooling, hot air supply, hot water, gas, liquefied 
petroleum gas, natural gas, coal/charcoal products for household use; 
Book, newspapers, magazines 
Feeds, chemical fertilizers, agricultural chemicals, agricultural machinery 
and plastic converting film for farming; 













Source：Ministry of Finance, PRC, “Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic 
of China on Value-added Tax ” 
 
The tax is also administered on an income base which does not allow the expensing of 
purchases of capital goods. This contrasts with the consumption base used in most 
other countries under which expensing is allowed. Recent tax changes have 
introduced elements of a consumption basis by region and by sector, and so now a 
mixture of the two bases operates. 
 
Earlier VAT literature on a switch from destination to origin taxation shows such 
switch at given tax rates may have no real effects because adjustments of exchange 
rate and price levels may offset tax effects (Whalley, 1979;  Krugman, 1980; 
  5Grossman,1980). Substituting the origin principle (tax on exports, no tax on imports) 
for the destination principle (tax on import, no tax on export) thus should have no 
affects on real trade. Since a tax on exports is equivalent to a tax on imports, 
compensating exchange rate and price level adjustments simply restore the original 
equilibrium. Generally, full price flexibility in a competitive economy, is taken to 
imply that a comprehensive uniform-rate VAT and yields this equivalence in practice. 
Lockwood (Lockwood etal., 1994a, 1994b) extend his analysis to imperfect 
competitive economy, money economy and when transport cost is taken into account. 
They find, under assumptions that are different from the earlier literature, that 
nonequivalence may applies and distortionary policies can influence the economy in 
various  ways.   
 
Besides this equivalence, literature also notes that the administration of the origin 
principle is difficult. If exports are to be taxed, export values must be verified to 
ensure that all domestic value added is included in the base. Arm’s length pricing 
rules from the application of separate accounting principles under the corporate 
income tax would have to be adopted. National tax credits, would have to be attached 
to imports at amounts equal to the product of the domestic VAT rate and arm’s length 
import values to ensure that they would not be taxed in domestic stages of production 
or distribution. Thus, in contrast to the assumptions made in earlier literature, the 
proper treatment of exports and imports under the origin principle seemingly requires 
the maintenance or re-establishment of border controls. 
 
Equally, tax effects of the VAT are typically analyzed assuming that the trade balance 
is exogenous if international trade is taken into account. The unrealism of this 
assumption in the Chinese case is especially troublesome since trade balance is a 
major element in the structure and reflects exchange rate and monetary policies. Here 
we start from the classical neutrality literature Whalley (Whalley, 1979) and 
Lockwood (Lockwood, 1994a, 1994b) and introduce monetary non neutralities in 
analyzing how under a fixed exchange regime, when the trade surplus is 
  6endogenously determined, features of VAT structure traditionally regarded as impure 
can nonetheless be welfare preferred. 
 
3  Export  Rebates 
 
The first impurity in China’s VAT that we discuss are limits placed on the rebate of 
input tax credits as they relate to exports. Exports are zero rated as in conventional 
VATs, but export rebates of inputs credits are restricted in various ways and rebate 
rates differ from statutory rates. There are both general policies by product and sector 
(which change over time) as to the amount of rebate allowed, and specific responses 
to trade pressures from importing countries (as in apparel) that temporarily suspend 
rebates. 
 
The origins of this system lie in the 1994 introduction of the VAT when full rebates 
were planned and the government earmarked a certain amount of revenue for rebates. 
Due to sharp export growth, and bogus invoices and rebate claims, much of the 
claimed 1994 rebates had to be deferred. In 1995, the government budget could again 
not cover requested rebates (which were double the budget ), and the government 
changed the rebate rate. The rebate rate was set at 14% on items taxable at 17%, 10% 
for items taxable at 13%, and 3% on a small range of items. A year later the 
government once again could not cover the requested rebates, and rebate rates fell 
further to 10% from 14% and to 6% from 10%. Table 2 lists refund rates currently 















All non-metal mineral products (except cement and mine salt)   
include Crude oil, coal, natural gas, wax etc. 
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China,  selected  leather  product  and  cement,  glass           
Selected  metal  mineral  products                 






Important equipment, selected IT products and   




Source: Taxation Administration of China. 
 
Between 1991 and 1995, rebates accounted for 7%-10.5% of government 
expenditures. The growth rate of export rebates in 1996 was 50.5% in part due to 
rapid export growth from foreign invested enterprises, but also due to fraud and 
invalid VAT invoices. The share of VAT revenues going to local governments (who 
did not contribute to rebates before 2003) compounded the problem.   
 
Also, as China’s exports grew in the late 1990’s, and the share of processing trade 
  8involving imported components also grew, more than half of China’s exports came 
from export processing zones where imports entered both duty free and free of VAT. 
This created a strong incentive for local firms to convert to processing trade from 
general trade, since they were still eligible for export rebates. These fiscal problems of 
processing trade, tax revenue assignment to local governments, and false involves 
again forced the central government to limit export tax rebates. 
 
Export rebates have thus evolved in ways which are unrelated to input taxes paid on 
materials as in a conventional credit-invoice VAT, and schedules of allowable rebates 
are announced which are changed from time to time. These are then supplemented by 
ad hoc product specific announcements to change or terminate rebates usually as a 
result of pressure (actual or perceived ) to slow export growth to key markets abroad. 
 
These refunds work in the following way. The enterprise first pays VAT to the 
government ignoring that export products. Each enterprise engaged in export activity 
calculates its VAT liabilities as   
 
i i i i R tM tS T − − =                        
where   are  taxes payable, t is the VAT rate,   are sales of enterprise i,   are 
material inputs of firm i, and    is the refundable VAT on exports sales. Refunds, in 
turn, are calculated as: 
i T i S i M
i R
 
                                               i i i r E R =
where   are export sales,   is the refund rate (as per cent in Table 2). t≥ 0, 
and if  =0 no refund on all export sales applies. This rebate differs from a credit 
invoice VAT in applying to the full value of exports, not just the material input 
component, but if added materials are used to produce export non export VAT is 
correspondingly reduced. 
i E i r i r ≥
i r
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The net result of this structure is a series of export rebates at varying rates across 
products and sectors which are little connected to the taxes paid on material inputs, 
with effects both on trade patterns and trade volumes. And in a model with monetary 
non neutralities the endogenously determined trade surplus is affected, and changes in 
rebate rates can be partial substitute instruments for exchange rate realignment. This 
latter linkage has been much discussed in China.   
 
The second element of impurity in the Chinese VAT relates to the use of an income 
basis for the tax in contrast to the more conventional consumption base used in most 
countries, where capital good purchases are expensed under the VAT. Fixed assets for 
Chinese VAT purposes include machines and transport equipment; effectively all 
capital equipment used in production regardless of whether the equipment was 
imported or purchased domestically. This implies input taxes apply to capital goods 
through the production process. 
 
This treatment is however in transition. In January 2004 a pilot program was launched 
covering 8 sectors (including oil, chemical and autos) in 3 provinces (Heilongjiang, 
Jilin and Liaoning) to evaluate the application of VAT on a consumption basis by 
allowing deductions for capital goods. Also, as part of 11
th 5-year-plan in 2005, VAT 
input credits for capital goods are extended to the production of high technology 
goods. A mixed income/consumption basis is thus evolving. Both of these impurities 
represent a considerable departure from a classical pure form of VAT. 
 
4.  Modeling  the  effects   
 
We first discuss the impacts of changes in VAT structure in standard classical models, 
and then subsequently discuss models which depart from this form by explicitly 
capturing monetary non-neutralities and allowing for the endogenous determination of 
the trade surplus. In this latter class of models, tax structures which reduce exports 
  10will tend to reduce the surplus, and this reduces central bank accumulation of foreign 
currency to support a fixed exchange rate (with inconvertibility). This will be welfare 
improving in a static model. While simple, this formulation is clearly closer to the 
contemporary situation in China and in such a model an impure VAT may dominate a 
pure VAT by generating a smaller trade surplus. Thus, given China’s current macro 
policy posture, an impure VAT may dominate a pure VAT. 
 
4.1  The standard classical case 
 
In a classical world it is relatively easy to demonstrate the neutrality of either a 
consumption (destination) or origin ( production ) broadly based VAT levied at a 
single rate. For simplicity, we can consider 2 countries with 2 producers and 2 factors.   
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First order conditions imply the following, where factor prices are  ,  and goods 





























The demand side for each economy reflects utility maximizing behavior for a single 
representative agent, that is: 





j M D U                             ( 2 )  















i S Y p M pm D pd − = + ∑ ∑ ) (     j=1,2 
where  and  are domestic and imported goods i in j country, and   and 










Equilibrium in this economy is given by market clearing prices for goods and factors 
such that 
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K  and 
j
L   are endowments of capital and labor in country j. 
 
Defining the net trade, import   as the difference between domestic demand and 
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If follows directly from the budget constraint that balanced trade holds, we have 










i E p M p
If we then consider a monetized extension of this model where prices are 
denominated in terms of domestic currency with an exchange rate e between the two 
domestic moneys, then cross country arbitrage between the country specific prices 
with no tax distortion in trade yields: 
                        i=1,2                      ( 6 )  
2 1
i i ep p =
  12If, in turn, we consider only transactions demand for money in each country with 
unitary velocity and exporters being paid in their own country currency, we have a 
transactions demand for money in each country. In equilibrium 










i m M pm D pd ∑ = + ) (      j = 1 , 2             ( 7 )  
where 
j
M   is the money stock in country j. 
 
In this model, money is neutral in the sense that once domestic money stocks are 
specified, then an equilibrium exchange rate is determined independently of the real 
side. If instead e is fixed at  e, then the relative domestic money stocks  j i m m /  need 
to accommodate to  e  so as to support it as an equilibrium exchange rate. 
 
The neutrality of movements between a broadly based VAT administered on a 
destination (consumption) or origin (production) basis, or indeed between no VAT and 
a VAT for this economy follows directly. If we define      as the consumer price of 
good i in country j and   as the producer price under both a production and a 
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The differences in tax structure between an origin and destination based tax in country 
j appears in the cross country international arbitrage conditions. Under an origin based 
tax on production 
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, or if e increases by (1+t), the same 
equilibrium will prevail both in a no tax case, and under an origin or destination basis 
tax. Taxes and their bases are neutral in effect. 
 
4.2  Non accommodative monetary policy, and fixed exchange rate case 
 
If, however, as in China the monetary regime is non accommodative to the fixed 
exchange rate chosen and the surplus (and accumulation of reserves) are 
endogenously determined the neutrality propositions above for broadly based taxes 
breakdown. In this case, an impure VAT can be welfare preferred to a pure VAT. This 
can occur, for example, if for a given statutory rate there is a smaller surplus 
associated with the impure VAT compared to the pure VAT. 
 
To analyze this case, we assume a fixed exchange rate  e  chosen by country 1 who is 
willing to support the rate with reserve accumulation which implies trade surpluses. 
We thus assume that monetary policy in countries 1 and 2 as represented by    2 1 /m m  
is non-accomodative of  e, and a trade surplus (deficit) results in country 1 ( 2 ). 
 
In this case, the budget constraints for each country in the no tax case are given by   
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where   represents  the  endogenously determined trade surplus in 1 in the currency 
1 S
  14of j.  , in turn, is 
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And the corresponding trade deficit    in country 2 is: 
2 D




i i E p M p D
2 2 2 2 2                   ( 1 3 )  
In equilibrium,  = , and in this case, money demand functions change to reflect 
the surplus and become 
1 S
2 D
            
1 1 1 m X p
i
i i ∑ =  
            
2 2 2 m S X p
i
j
i i ∑ = +  
 
The surplus thus is accommodated in the model by the central bank in country i 




In this world, a consumption based VAT will be similar to the classical case in that 
arbitrage across countries will still imply that   
2 1 ) 1 ( i i p t e p + =
∧









             (export  not  taxed)   
and so no adjustment is needed in either p  or e to achieve the same equilibrium. 
However, a tax structure that reduces S will typically be welfare preferred for country 




The case of a production (origin) based VAT will also no longer be equivalent to a 
destination basis VAT on consumption. In these cases, the international arbitrage 
conditions are as before, that is: 
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Here equivalence can no longer be obtained by adjustments only in either    p  or  in 
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 , then S would have to change which would 
change all  Y  and X , or e increase by (1+t).  Equally changing p  by (1+t) , 










The impure VAT can be modeled directly using a fixed coefficient technology   




In this case, the zero profit conditions for good i in country j become 
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where   is depreciation rate on capital in j in sector i.   is depreciation rate of 
return on capital in sector i in j and   is the common net of depreciation 
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Taxes on value added of consumption type with full input credit yield zero profit 
conditions 
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If we treat the lack of input credits on capital pure purchases as equivalent to allowing 
no deduction for depreciation from the gross return on capital, taxes on value added of 
the income type with full input credit yield 
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  16which allows income and consumption type VATs to be compared. If the income type 
VAT results in a smaller value of S it will typically be welfare preferred. 
 
Export rebates at rates which differ from statutory rates used for taxes on input and 
apply to the total value of product rather than just value added used directly can then 
be incorporated. In this case, under a destination based VAT the cross country 
arbitrage conditions become 
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where r refers to the export rebate rate as in the Chinese structure described earlier. In 
this case given the rebates applies to the value of all production, the zero profit 
conditions for exporting sectors become 
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The issue then becomes the impacts of these impurities in the VAT system on trade 
patterns, S and hence on welfare. As emphasized in the introduction, we put all of the 
non trade effects connected to VATs structure (such as labor/leisure distortions) on one 
side and only evaluate trade effects. 
 
5.    Model based analyses of the experience with China’s VAT reform 
 
5.1    Data  and  parameterization 
 
Our VAT model of China with monetary non neutralities incorporates 2 countries and 
10 traded goods (agriculture and energy, manufactures, and other sectors). Applied 
export rebate rates are from Development Research Centre, State Council. China. 
Value-added tax rates are from Taxation Administration of China (See Table 3). We 
construct a model compatible benchmark equilibrium data set for calibration (see 
  17Dawkins, Srinivasan and Whalley 2001). Due to the multi-country character of the 
data set, ensuring model consistency of data is a problem in building the benchmark 
data. We first use total output, sectoral output, domestic consumption, total import and 
export for China and the rest of the world from GTAP 5 database for 1997 to get the 
share parameter. Then we use data from China’s 2002 input-output table yielding 
China’s gross output, and totals for imports and exports. Using share data from GTAP 
and China’s data from the input-output table, we generate China’s sectoral gross 
output, import and export data for 2002. China’s exports are taken as imports by the 
rest of the world from China. All the above data are recorded in Table 4.   
  
Table 3  Rates of VAT and export rebate rate by commodity used in the model 
simulation 
 
     Commodity  Classification        Rate of VAT    Export Rebate Rate
2 
 
1.  Agriculture  13%  0% 
2.  Energy  product
3 17%  6.31% 
3.  Textile  17%  6.31% 
4.  Other  light  manufacturing  17%  6.31% 
5.  Manufacture  intermediate  17%  6.31% 
6.  Motor  vehicle        17%  6.31% 
7.  Other transportation equipment  17%  6.31% 
8.  Electronic  equipment   17%  6.31% 
9.  Other  manufacturing  goods  17%  6.31% 




                                                        
2  The rebate rate in this column are sourced from GTAP, see Zhi Wang (2003). 
3  Actually crude oil is levied at 17% for VAT. 
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Table 4     2 Country Base Case Data in 2002 for China and ROW (the Rest of the World) used to calibrate the model 
 
China 
  (in billion RMB*
4) 
 
Value of Production 
 
Value of Consumption 
 
Exports to ROW 
  




1.  Agriculture  757.05  728.07  28.29  28.98  -0.69 
2.  Energy  product
5 295.41  272.65  17.40  22.76  -5.36 
3.  Textile  220.43  183.01  107.13  37.43  69.71 
4.  Other  light  manufacturing  55.78  52.12  34.91  3.66  31.26 
5.  Manufacture  intermediate  649.51  566.36  49.38  83.15  -33.77 
6.  Motor  vehicle  62.02  55.48  2.05  6.53  -4.49 
7.  Other transportation equipment  25.21  18.75  5.23  6.46  -1.23 
8.  Electronic  equipment   83.80  41.04  48.99  42.76  6.24 
9.  Other  manufacturing  goods  351.98  288.69  48.44  63.29  -14.85 
10.  Service  1285.58  1255.08  32.03  30.51  1.53 
 
ROW  
  (in million US$) 
 
Value of Production 
 
Value of Consumption 
 
Exports to China 
 
Import from China 
 
Net trade 
1.  Agriculture  5788.21  5759.92  28.98  28.29  0.69 
2.  Energy  product
6 1995.92  1978.52  22.76  17.40  5.36 
3.  Textile  1319.77  1212.64  37.43  107.13  -69.71 
4.  Other  light  manufacturing  495.55  460.63  3.66  34.91  -31.26 
5.  Manufacture  intermediate  5710.10  5660.73  83.15  49.38  33.77 
6.  Motor  vehicle  1440.07  1438.02  6.53  2.05  4.49 
7.  Other transportation equipment  488.57  483.34  6.46  5.23  1.23 
8.  Electronic  equipment   1354.54  1305.55  42.76  48.99  -6.24 
9.  Other  manufacturing  goods  1701.03  1652.59  63.29  48.44  14.85 
10.  Service  34029.13  33997.10  30.51  32.03  -1.53 
 
                                                        
4  The currency unit used here for Chinese domestic currency is artificial in that we set it to 8.277RMB which is the exchange rate of the US dollar to Renminbi in 2002, this implies that 1 unit RMB* 
equals 1 US dollar before we scale all the data for 2005. This convention is adapted so that in calibration all equilibrium prices will be unity. 
5  Actually crude oil is levied at 17% for VAT. 
6  Actually crude oil is levied at 17% for VAT. We use a Leontief technology to present total output; and Cobb-Douglas production 
with constant returns to scale as value-added function in the 2 countries. On the 
demand side, we use CES composites and initially set substitution elasticities to equal 
to 2 in both countries. We use this as the central case although the literature provides 
different estimates of this key elasticity. Many of the estimates of domestic and 
import good substitution are around 2 or greater than 2 (See Betina (2003)). Table 5 
and 6 report parameter values in production and preferences generated by calibration, 
as well as shares of intermediate imports in China’s imports that are used in 
counterfactual analysis. 
 
Our benchmark case is a VAT with the impurities we analyze present. We then 
simulate counterfactuals. One is taxes on value-added of the consumption type and 
full export rebating (scenario 1); another is only VAT on value-added on a 
consumption base(scenario2); and a third is with full rebating of export taxes at 
statutory rate. We are also able to analyze cases where there is a substitute change in 
exchange rates and export rebates. 
 
The rates of export rebates are clearly important. Statutory rates according to Chinese 
Law are listed in Table 3. Using these rates directly in our simulation procedure 
potentially overestimates the effect of export rebates on export and import for a 
number reasons. One is that the rates listed in table 3 are just for selected goods that 
belongs to our model commodity classification rather than all goods that are classified 
into these groups of commodities. Secondly, according to statistical data from China 
official documents, export rebates divided by the exports yield an average actual 
rebate rate across all goods of around 5%. However, given a lack of information on 
export rebate by good, even though actual export rebate rates differ from the legal 
rates, to implement a full rebate simulation we simply use the rebate rates according 
to the law as our base case. 
 
  20Table 5      shares in Cobb-Douglas production functions
7 
 
  China                Rest of the world 
Share  Share  









1.  Agriculture  0.1241  0.5289  0.3470  0.2794  0.3280  0.3927 
2.  Energy  product  0.3954  0.1947  0.4099  0.3631  0.2322  0.4047 
3.  Textile  0.2873  0.2258  0.4869  0.2171  0.3257  0.4572 
4.  Other  light  manufacturing  0.3090  0.2428  0.4481  0.2440  0.3106  0.4454 
5.  Intermediate  manufacturing   0.3640  0.1635  0.4724  0.2383  0.3430  0.4187 
6.  Motor  vehicle  0.4014  0.1338  0.4648  0.1680  0.3570  0.4750 
7.  O t h e r          
transportation equipment 
0.2922  0.1716  0.5362  0.1561  0.4221  0.4218 
8.  Electronic  equipment   0.2277  0.1121  0.6602  0.1903  0.3241  0.4856 
9.  Other  manufacturing  goods  0.3095  0.1979  0.4926  0.1792  0.3639  0.4569 
10.  Service  0.3557  0.2795  0.3647  0.3010  0.4156  0.2834 
   
 
                                                        
7  Original data used in calibration for production functions are from the GTAP version-5 database. We aggregate skilled and un-skilled labor and generate a labor endowment for China and the 
rest of the world. Land and sector specific resources are not taken into account in production. 
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Table 6   Share parameters for imports and domestic goods in nested CES 
utility functions 
 














1.  Agriculture  0.19  0.81  0.06  0.94 
2.  Energy  product  0.25  0.75  0.08  0.92 
3.  Textile  0.35  0.65  0.21  0.79 
4.  Other  light 
manufacturing 
 
0.24 0.76 0.19  0.81 
5.  Manufacture 
intermediate 
 
0.31 0.69 0.08  0.92 
6.  Motor  vehicle  0.29  0.71  0.03  0.97 
9.  Other transportation 
equipment 
 
0.41 0.59 0.08  0.92 
8.  Electronic 
equipment  
 
0.54 0.46 0.14  0.86 
9.  Other 
manufacturing goods 
 
0.35 0.65 0.13  0.87 








  225.2   Simulation  results 
 
We have used our calibrated model to simulate changes in tax arrangements on both 
China’s trade flows and welfare. We firstly compare an elimination of China’s export 
rebate and an appreciation of the RMB by 5% with a fixed money stock in both China 
and the rest of the world. Then we keep the export rebates unchanged into our model, 
but shift from an income based VAT to a consumption basis. Finally, we assess the 
impacts of joint elimination of export rebates and using a consumption basis VAT on 
trade and welfare. 
 
Results are presented in Tables 7 and 8. Table 7 shows that with a complete 
elimination of VAT export rebates, all sectors in China increase their imports in 
quantity terms which range from 0~16.9%, with the biggest changes in textiles, other 
light industries and electronic equipment. All sectors decrease their exports, by an 
average of 11%. However, decreasing exports causes an increase in the final use of 
domestically produced goods and welfare increases by 1.45%. To compare currency 
revaluation and changed tax arrangements, we also let China’s RMB revalue by 5%, 
and find that the 2 instruments are substitutes.   
 
We then compare the income basis VAT and a consumption basis VAT. Table 8 shows 
if we tax imports rather than exports, imports decrease sharply by around 20%. 
Exports changes very little compare to imports. Welfare in this case decreases by 
2.3%. 
 
Finally, we calibrate the opposite case to China’s currently impure VAT, which is the 
case of no export rebate with consumption basis VAT. We find both exports and 
imports of China decrease substantially, with export decrease around 11% and imports 
decrease around 20%. Welfare thus lose 0.9%. 
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Table 7   Impacts of eliminating export rebate and a 5% appreciation of the 
RMB on welfare, import and exports of China 
 
  Elimination export rebate  RMB revaluation 5% 
   
% change in 
exports 
 









1.  Agriculture  0.00  0.00  -9.57  10.99 
2.  Energy  product  -11.64  0.87  -9.62  11.28 
3.  Textile  -11.83  8.13  -9.89  17.58 
4.  Other  light 
manufacturing 
-11.69 9.19 -9.63  18.38 
5.  Manufacture 
intermediate 
-11.65 1.19 -9.64  11.56 
6.  Motor  vehicle  -11.64  0.50  -9.56  10.96 
7.  Other transportation 
equipment 
-11.67 3.82 -9.65  13.81 
8.  Electronic  equipment   -12.07  16.92  -10.07  25.16 
9.  Other  manufacturing 
goods 
-11.70 2.31 -9.85  12.55 
10.  Service  -11.64  0.34  -9.54  10.83 
 
  Elimination export rebate  RMB revaluation 5% 










  24Table 8     Impacts of moving to a consumption VAT and the joint elimination of 
export rebates and a consumption VAT on trade flows and welfare 
 
                 Move to full export 
rebates 
Move to Consumption tax 
arrangement 
 













% change in 
import 
 
% change in 
export 
 
% change in 
import 
 
1.  Agriculture 
 
32.12 -1.46  0.09 -20.63 32.24  -21.80 
2.  Energy  product 
 
28.28  -2.11 0.23 -23.47  28.58 -25.09 
3.  Textile 
 
28.95 -19.90  0.66  -24.38  29.63  -39.51 
4.  Other  light 
manufacturing 
 
28.46 -22.38  0.16  -24.14  28.63  -41.14 
5.  Manufacture 
intermediate 
 
28.31 -2.89  0.30 -23.35 28.68  -25.58 
6.  Motor  vehicle 
 
28.26 -1.22  0.09 -23.04 28.38  -23.99 







0.27 -23.75 28.72  -30.86 
8.  Electronic 
equipment 
 
29.80 -41.77  0.69  -24.19  30.32  -55.98 




28.50 -5.61  0.80 -23.92 29.48  -28.22 
10.  Service 
 
28.26 -0.84  0.02 -24.05 28.28  -24.69 
  Move to full export 
rebates 
Move to Consumption tax 
arrangement 
 
Move to both 
% change in 







  25Table  9   Sensitivity  of  elasticity parameters in demand 
                                          
  Varying the elasticity of substitution between 
domestic and foreign products only in China 
 
  Value of elasticity used  0.5 0.75  1.0
8 1.5 2.0 
% change in imports 
 
     
Full export rebates  -10.42  -10.42  -10.42  -10.42  -10.42 
  Impure  export  rebates  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Zero  export  rebates  10.88  10.88  10.88  10.88  10.88 
       
% change in exports 
 
     
Full export rebates  29.01  29.01  29.01  29.01  29.01 
  Impure  export  rebates  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
  Zero  export  rebates  4.13  4.13  4.13  4.13  4.13 
          






















                                                        
8  Because we use a CES form in the code, we use 0.999 rather than 1 here in execution. 
  266.   Conclusion 
 
We discuss two significant impurities in China’s VAT. One is incomplete rebating of 
taxes on inputs used for exports through a separate rebate system to the statutory rate. 
The other is the use of an income rather than a consumption basis. We argue that in 
classical public finance models these would both be treated as distortionary and the 
source of a welfare cost. In a monetary trade model in which there is a fixed exchange 
rate, non accommodative monetary policy, inconvertibility and endogenous reserve 
accumulation things are different. Both of them departures from price can raise export 
prices and reduce the surplus and yield a welfare gain. We show this using a 
calibrated monetary trade general equilibrium model of China based on 2002 data. 
This is suggestion of a broader theme that elements of China’s policy structure that 
might strike outsiders as odd, makes more sense once the wider policy environment 
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